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A B S T R A C T
Encouraged by the falling cost of batteries, electric vehicle (EV) policy today focuses on expediting elec-
triﬁcation, paying comparatively little attention to the cost of the particular type of EVs and charging infra-
structure deployed. This paper argues that, due to its strong inﬂuence on EV innovation paths, EV policy could be
better designed if it paid more attention to cost and technology development risk. In particular, using a model
that estimates the incremental cost of diﬀerent EV and infrastructure mixes over the whole passenger car ﬂeet,
we ﬁnd that EV policy with a strong bias towards long-range battery electric vehicles (BEVs) risks leading to
higher costs of electriﬁcation in the medium term, possibly exceeding the ability of governments to sustain the
necessary incentives until battery cost drops suﬃciently. We also ﬁnd that promoting a balanced mix of BEVs
and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) may set the electriﬁcation of passenger cars on a lower risk, lower
cost path. Examining EV policy in the UK and in California, we ﬁnd that it is generally not incompatible with
achieving balanced mixes of BEVs and PHEVs. However some ﬁne tuning would allow to better balance medium
term risks and long term goals.
1. Introduction
1.1. Government support to electric vehicles
Road transport accounted for 21% of global energy consumption
and 17% of global CO2 emissions in 2013 (IEA, 2015c). Carbon emis-
sions from road transport have been growing steadily and will continue
to do so if road transport is not progressively decoupled from fossil fuels
(EIA, 2014). In particular, stabilizing global temperature increase to
below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels will require a combination of
improved fuel eﬃciency and deployment of alternative fuels in road
transport, particularly advanced biofuels, electricity and, to a lesser
extent, hydrogen (IEA, 2015a; Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2012). Scenarios
may diﬀer as a multitude of energy technology pathways are possible
(IPCC, 2014), however it is generally accepted that electric vehicles
(EVs) will have a major role to play, especially in large markets such as
the US, Europe, China and India. Electriﬁcation of passenger car
transport also has the added beneﬁt of reducing emissions of local air
pollutants in urban areas, the impacts of which on public health are of
growing concern in both developed and developing countries (OECD,
2014).
For the reasons noted, electriﬁcation of passenger car transport is
receiving strong support from several national governments worldwide
which seek not only to meet their environmental protection goals but
also to develop national value chains in this emerging industry (Lutsey,
2015). Alongside aspirational targets set by several governments,
electriﬁcation is increasingly being driven by regulation. Most notably,
the California Zero Emission Vehicle mandate sets mandatory targets
for EV sales; this type of regulation is increasingly being adopted across
the US and Canada. In the European Union the Directive on the de-
ployment of alternative fuel infrastructure (European Union, 2014)
mandates that Member States develop national policy frameworks for
future EV charging infrastructure rollout.
In order to achieve their targets, both aspirational and legally-
binding, national and local governments are deploying sets of in-
centives to EV adoption, including purchase grants, tax exemptions,
non-monetary incentives such as free parking and access to restricted
lanes, and ﬁnancial support for the development of extensive charging
infrastructure (IEA, 2013; Lutsey, 2015). Incentives are necessary to
overcome the substantial cost gap currently existing between EVs and
conventional internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) and the ﬁrst
mover disadvantage that characterises the development of alternative
fuel infrastructures (NRC, 2015). For their part, automotive OEMs are
producing an increasingly diverse range of EV models in order to
comply with mandates and standards while gaining competitiveness.
Although ﬂeet penetration on a global level is still low, the market
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share of electric vehicles is growing fast (IEA, 2015b). In some coun-
tries, such as Norway and the Netherlands, the market share of EVs has
reached substantial levels, while the US, Japan and China lead the way
in terms of the absolute size of their EV stocks, and several new markets
are starting to develop (IEA, 2015b).
Despite some early success stories and the growing momentum be-
hind the EV transition, rapidly reaching a high level of EV penetration
globally will be challenging, because of strong economic, institutional
and behavioural barriers, together with the inherently slow turnover
rate of passenger car stocks (Element Energy, 2013; NRC, 2015; Struben
and Sterman, 2008). For this reason, in today's policy discourse much
emphasis is placed on identifying those mixes of policy instruments that
are most eﬀective at accelerating the deployment of EVs and related
charging infrastructure (Lutsey, 2015). Comparatively little attention is
devoted to clearly articulating a vision of future self-sustained elec-
triﬁcation of passenger car transport that does not solely rely on the
cost of EV batteries rapidly falling. However, considering that the
current high levels of government incentives cannot be sustained in-
deﬁnitely, we argue that policy should also be designed taking account
of the need to guide the EV transition towards low cost and low tech-
nology risk pathways.
1.2. Aim and objectives
The aim of our work is to assess whether today's EV policy is con-
ducive to a future cost-eﬀective use of this technology, considering the
policy objectives it aims to achieve, particularly carbon emission re-
duction. We do so by exploring the incremental costs of future mixes of
EVs and charging infrastructures that are broadly compatible with to-
day's policy and market trends, and that can provide similar carbon
emission reductions. We use the results of our cost analysis as a basis for
discussion of key features and possible implications of current EV
policy, and to identify opportunities for making it more robust under
uncertainty.
In Section 2 we discuss the eﬀect that deployment policy has on EV
innovation pathways, including the possibility of technological lock-ins.
Section 3 presents the methods used in the study and their limitations.
Section 4 describes the current policy framework and deployment tar-
gets for the UK and California, the case studies chosen. Section 5 pre-
sents the results of the two case studies and discusses their policy im-
plications. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. EV deployment policy and its eﬀect on innovation
Due to the speciﬁc characteristics of each market, the widely dif-
fering underlying taxation of conventional vehicles and fuels, and the
lack of generally accepted best practices, diﬀerent approaches have so
far been used. As a result, diﬀerent patterns of deployment of EVs and
charging infrastructure have begun to emerge in the most active
countries and regions, i.e.: China, Europe, Japan and the U.S. (IEA,
2013, 2015b; Lutsey, 2015). In particular, diﬀerent ratios of pure bat-
tery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
(PHEVs) and of rapid charging and slow charging infrastructure can be
observed across leading countries (IEA, 2013, 2015b). BEVs operate
solely on electricity while PHEVs can operate on both battery power
and an internal combustion engine, especially once the battery is de-
pleted; the internal combustion engine and electric components of the
powertrain can be arranged either in parallel or in series; the latter are
also referred to as range extended electric vehicles (RE-EVs). In this
paper we will use the term PHEVs for both types, unless otherwise
speciﬁed. The term slow chargers is here used to indicate charging
points of 3–7 kW power; rapid chargers supply power of the order of
40–50 kW. Figs. 1 and 2 provide and illustration of the diﬀerent pat-
terns of EV and charging infrastructure deployment observed today
(IEA, 2016).
Evidence shows that incentives strongly inﬂuence the overall rate of
EV uptake and the relative market shares of BEVs and PHEVs (Mock and
Yang, 2014). In Norway for example BEVs receive generous support,
whereas PHEVs have only recently become eligible for some, hence the
rapid rate of uptake of BEVs. In the Netherlands incentives for BEVs and
PHEVs have been similar, hence the dominance of PHEVs that oﬀer
better functionality. In California, where BEVs qualify for higher in-
centives than PHEVs, their market shares are comparable (Brook
Lyndhurst, 2015). Hence, government incentives to EV purchase,
combined with the underlying taxation of conventional fuels and ve-
hicles, determine the type of EVs that are most competitive and also the
market segments in which the value they oﬀer relative to ICEVs is
highest. This in turn inﬂuences the EV types and models that auto-
motive OEMs will commercialise in order to achieve highest possible
sales.
Moreover, public charging infrastructure is a strong enabler of BEV
adoption (Sierzchula et al., 2014), so some countries are building ex-
tensive networks of public chargers, be they rapid or slow, that an-
ticipates possible user needs (Brook Lyndhurst, 2015; NRC, 2015). The
particular type, density and location of charging points aim to reduce
range anxiety and increase the perceived utility of BEVs to a level
comparable to ICEVs. However, it is diﬃcult to anticipate how well this
will work in practice and the extent to which the infrastructure will
Fig. 1. Market share of EVs in selected countries in 2015, broken down by BEVs and
PHEVs.
Source: adapted from (IEA, 2016).
Fig. 2. Charging point/EV ratio in selected countries in 2015, respectively for fast (top)
and slow chargers (bottom).
Source: adapted from (IEA, 2016).
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actually be utilised (Brook Lyndhurst, 2015; NRC, 2015).
The trends shown in Figs. 1 and 2 can change in future as policy
support measures are periodically adjusted by governments in response
to market developments. In particular, at least in part encouraged by
recent evidence showing a rapid rate of decrease of EV battery cost
(Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015), a growing number of countries are cur-
rently increasing their support for BEVs relative to PHEVs, which some
consider as a transitional technology. However to the best of our
knowledge the relevant policy documents do not explicitly discuss the
overall cost of the particular EV and charging infrastructure mixes they
seek to promote. Because the emphasis is on rapidly electrifying pas-
senger car transport, it is therefore possible that the EV and charging
infrastructure mixes that will be deployed in the short and medium
term will not provide the most practical and cost eﬀective way of
achieving the intended goals.
This is problematic because the process of development and adop-
tion of new technology such as EVs exhibits path-dependence and is
prone to lock-in eﬀects (Åhman and Nilsson, 2008). In other words, the
type of EVs and infrastructure initially deployed will inﬂuence the be-
haviour and preferences of adopters and the development of related
institutions, and hence will contribute to pushing future EV technology
and infrastructure development down a certain path. This will in turn
further inﬂuence consumer adoption of new EV models and the de-
velopment of policy and regulation, in a process that in technology
studies is generally referred to as co-evolution (Dijk and Yarime, 2010;
Geels, 2012). This is schematically illustrated in Fig. 3.
As policy and regulation co-evolve with the new technology and the
preferences of its users become entrenched, electriﬁcation of passenger
cars will become increasingly locked into certain mixes of EV and
charging infrastructure types. In the early phases of the EV transition
these mixes are made competitive by the policy incentives that support
the electriﬁcation process. However as higher levels of adoption are
reached and policy support measures are withdrawn, costs will in-
creasingly be passed on to EV users. The actual cost of electriﬁcation
will then become very important in determining whether or not the EV
transition will be able to sustain itself. Switching to more cost eﬀective
electriﬁcation paths later on would still be possible but challenging.
Meanwhile the whole EV transition could risk stalling. In light of this,
posing the question whether today's EV and infrastructure policy is
conducive to cost-eﬀective electriﬁcation of passenger cars becomes
more important.
3. Methods
The future cost and emissions of diﬀerent types of EVs has been
studied extensively. Numerous studies can be found in the literature
that cover the whole spectrum of economic assessments of EVs, from
detailed powertrain cost and performance modelling aimed at guiding
the design of systems or components, to studies comparing the lifetime
cost and emissions of diﬀerent EV types in order to inform policy
making. Common to most of these studies is the use of the Relative Cost
of Ownership (RCO) metrics that enables estimation of the cost of in-
dividual EVs over their lifetime and comparison across diﬀerent pow-
ertrain types. As the name suggests, RCO does not consider all costs but
only those that are relevant to the comparison being made. A brief
critical review of relevant studies in this area is provided in Appendix A.
These studies have generated a large amount of knowledge on the
economics of EVs, however they tend to focus on single vehicles as
opposed to whole ﬂeets and charging infrastructures. Moreover, the
results they generate are based on the use of fairly complex models
which may lack transparency and ﬂexibility, and may not be easy to
communicate or update when new evidence becomes available.
In order to address the gaps we identiﬁed, we developed a model
that calculates the incremental cost and emission savings of future EV
and charging infrastructure mixes. The model performs RCO calcula-
tions for single vehicles and integrates them over the whole ﬂeet by
including all the key factors with the minimum possible level of de-
tailed complexity. An overview of the model structure is provided in
Fig. 4. The model relies on inputs from a number of speciﬁc studies and
technical modelling activities, which can be updated as appropriate. By
following this approach we aim to create a tool that is ﬂexible, trans-
parent, and that can facilitate discussion around policy support to
electriﬁcation. It is worth mentioning that all those cost elements that
are common to both EVs and ICEVs are not considered in the model.
Nor are vehicle and fuel taxation accounted for in our study. This
corresponds to assuming that non-CO2 related taxation of EVs will be
the same as that of ICEVs. CO2 taxation is not included either. However,
to ensure our analysis is meaningful, we compare only EV mixes that
are characterised by similar average tailpipe CO2 emissions across the
whole ﬂeet. In this way our results are not inﬂuenced by assumptions
on the price of CO2 emissions. Furthermore, to ensure that the utility of
the BEVs and PHEVs is broadly comparable, we set the range of BEVs
and the availability of charging infrastructure so as to satisfy the stated
requirements of passenger car users or their observed driving needs. A
full description of the model can be found in Appendix B.
Moreover, considering that the cost of electriﬁcation depends in
part on the technology inputs and in part on the speciﬁc vehicle market
examined, in our analysis we take a case study approach. We selected
the UK and California because both are aggressively pursuing elec-
triﬁcation of passenger cars and their markets are illustrative of large
European countries such as France and Germany and of North America
respectively. Another reason is the availability of information in
English. Finally, by comparing and contrasting the two cases, we test
the extent to which general lessons can be learned about the cost-ef-
fectiveness of policy-driven electriﬁcation. We base our analysis around
year 2030, because: a) current policy targets tend to refer to the
2025–2030 timeframe; b) the level of adoption foreseen is such that
lock-in eﬀects may begin to occur; and c) technology projections be-
come very uncertain beyond 2030.
As part of our analysis, we develop a set of electriﬁcation scenarios
for the UK and California in 2030 based on narratives that are broadly
consistent with current policy and market trends. It is worth stressing
though that they are not intended as predictions of the composition of
EV and infrastructure mixes in 2030 as they follow from particular
choices made by policymakers. In fact policy-making in the UK,
California and elsewhere, is ﬂexible enough to allow shifting direction
should it be required, and anticipating future decisions of policymakers
and their eﬀects is beyond the scope of our research. However, due to
lock-in eﬀects, major changes in direction will no doubt involve time
lags and additional costs.
The main limitations of the analysis presented in this paper are that:
a) it is of a snapshot type, i.e.: it assesses the incremental cost of elec-
triﬁcation for year 2030 only instead of the cumulative cost until that
year, and b) it does not apportion the incremental cost of electriﬁcation
Fig. 3. Schematic representation of the complex interlinkages among the multiple di-
mensions of the EV socio-technical system.
Source: Adapted from (Geels, 2012).
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among government, car manufacturers and passenger car buyers. The
implications of these limitations on our policy insights are discussed in
Section 5.4.
4. EVs in the UK and California: current policy and future
deployment
4.1. The UK
The UK is subject to EU transport and environmental policy (al-
though this will change as a result of the UK's referendum vote to leave
the EU). In particular the post-2020 EU ﬂeet average CO2 emission
standards for passenger cars, currently under negotiation, and the al-
ternative fuels infrastructure Directive will provide the strongest drivers
for electriﬁcation at European level. In addition to that, the UK has set
itself the legally binding target of reducing total GHG emissions, to
which transport is a major contributor, by 80% relative to 1990 levels
in 2050. In order to fulﬁl its domestic and European obligations, the UK
is committed to supporting the development and deployment of ultra-
low emission vehicles (ULEVs), particularly EVs, which the government
also sees as an opportunity to revive the country's automotive industry
(Chase et al., 2014). The UK government aspires to achieve near com-
plete decarbonisation of passenger car transport by 2050 and supports
electriﬁcation through ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives, which are
periodically revised based on observed market and technology devel-
opment. The UK government's approach to ULEVs is in general tech-
nology neutral, though the recently revised EV grant now has diﬀerent
levels for long and short All-Electric Range (AER) EVs, which is in-
tended to increase BEV over PHEV sales. Moreover, at present the
maximum number of grants available is capped at the same level for
BEVs and PHEVs, which also suggests a desire to balance the sales of
either EV type. See Table 1 below for an overview of current EV and
infrastructure deployment, government incentives supporting it and
future estimated EV and infrastructure levels required in order to sup-
port the UK achieve its climate change policy goals (Brook Lyndhurst,
2015; DfT, 2015; Element Energy, 2015; Element Energy, 2013; OLEV,
2016).
Evidence gathered from EV users in the UK suggests that adoption of
EVs is mainly by aﬄuent, multi-vehicle households in urban areas. EVs
are typically used as the main car, relied upon for the majority of daily
trips and driven on annual mileages comparable to those of ICEVs,
while the latter are used more for infrequent, longer journeys (Hutchins
et al., 2013). EV consumer research suggests that key barriers to EV
adoption remain price and for BEVs also range, with users expressing
desire for longer range vehicles for infrequent, longer trips (Brook
Lyndhurst, 2015). EV owners strongly prefer charging overnight at
home. This is due to convenience and not much inﬂuenced by avail-
ability of public infrastructure (Hutchins et al., 2013). However a fully
developed charging infrastructure, particularly rapid, is also perceived
as required for further BEV market expansion (Brook Lyndhurst, 2015).
Analysis conducted suggests that, to complement private residential
charging, the most valuable option is rapid charging infrastructure.
However the business case for it is still challenging, due to the expected
low utilisation rate. Continued government support will therefore be
required in order for the rapid charging infrastructure to develop in the
UK (Element Energy, 2015).
4.2. California
Like the UK, California has set itself the target of achieving an 80%
reduction of GHG emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 levels (Governor’s
Oﬃce, 2015b), with an interim target of 40% reduction by 2030. This
complements strong air quality policy, including the Low Emission
Vehicle standards of the California Air Resources Board. In order to
facilitate the achievement of the intended reduction in emissions of
GHGs and air pollutants from road transport while supporting the de-
velopment of a clean car industry in California, in 2012 Governor
Brown issued an executive order aimed at facilitating the rapid com-
mercialisation of Zero Emission Vehicles (ZEVs) (Governor’s Oﬃce,
2012). The executive order sets speciﬁc EV deployment targets, the
strategy for achieving which is set out in the 2013 ZEV Action Plan of
February 2013 (Governor’s Oﬃce, 2013), updated in 2015 based on a
review of the progress achieved until then (Governor’s Oﬃce, 2015a).
The strategy includes providing incentives to EV adoption and infra-
structure deployment as well as studying future infrastructure needs.
An infrastructure study was conducted by the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL) in 2014. The targets and key elements of the
strategy are summarised in Table 2 (AFCD, 2016; California Auto
Outlook, 2016; California Secretary of State, 2013b; Governor’s Oﬃce,
2013, 2015a; NREL, 2014). It is also worth mentioning that the 2015
ZEV Action Plan explicitly states that incentives should be cost-eﬀective
and withdrawn as early as possible: “Financial incentives continue to
play a critical role in making ZEVs cost competitive with conventional
vehicles during the early phases of their deployment, until economies of
Fig. 4. Schematic representation of the model structure.
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scale lead to cost reductions and a fully self-sustaining market”
(Governor’s Oﬃce, 2015a).
The executive order targets are broadly in line with the EV pene-
tration levels required by the ZEV mandate, although the exact EV
numbers required by the latter will depend on the compliance strategy
chosen by the OEMs. In particular, the ZEV mandate sets a minimum
number of credits that large and intermediate volume manufacturers
have to earn or purchase to comply and avoid ﬁnes. The credits are
earned through manufacturing pure ZEVs (i.e.: BEVs, a newly in-
troduced category of range extended BEVs called BEVx, and fuel cell
electric vehicles (FCEVs); the latter are not discussed in this paper) and
other ULEVs (such as PHEVs, also referred to in the regulation as
transitional ZEVs or TZEVs). BEVx are full BEVs also equipped with a
small ICE auxiliary power unit enabling them to operate at reduced
power when the AER is exhausted, and their non-electric range cannot
exceed their AER; hence the structure of the powertrain is similar to
that of a RE-EV but the components are sized diﬀerently and the utility
of the vehicle is substantially lower. The number of credits for each EV
is awarded proportional to its AER, based on diﬀerent formulas for
ZEVs and ULEVs. Although the regulation allows OEMs a certain degree
of ﬂexibility in the way they meet their credit obligations, minimum
ZEV credit ﬂoors apply. A synthesis of the ZEV mandate credit me-
chanism is provided in Table 2; we refer the reader to the relevant
regulation for full details (California Secretary of State, 2013a, b).
However it is important to note that the ZEV mandate will play a strong
role in deﬁning the future split between BEVs and PHEVs in California,
ensuring that BEVs (either pure BEV or BEVx) retain a substantial share.
Moreover, the credit mechanism for ZEVs is a contributing factor to the
Table 1
Current deployment, policy support measures and future estimated EV and charging infrastructure deployment needed in order to meet the UK's GHG emission reduction targets.
Source: (OLEV, 2016; Element Energy, 2015, Brook Lyndhurst, 2015; Element Energy, 2013, DfT, 2015.
Current deployment level Current government incentives Future government targets / deployment
requirements
EVs 1% market share in 2015 (1/3 BEVs, 2/3
PHEVs)
“Plug-in Car Grant” amounts to up to 35% of the
vehicle's retail price, for a maximum of £4500 for
EVs with AER of at least 110 km (currently BEVs)
and £2500 below 110 km (currently PHEVs). The
grant originally oﬀered a maximum of £5000 per
EV, irrespective of AER, and was amended in Mar
2016.
Aspirational target of 100% ULEV new car
registrations in 2040. No mandated EV targets.
Exemption from road user charges, notably
London's Congestion Charge.
The Committee on Climate Change estimates that
meeting UK's GHG emission targets requires between
4 and 8 m EVs on the road in 2030.
Charging
infrastructure
Circa 30,000 home charging points, 7000
workplace (open access) and 8000 public
charging points (7100 slow and 900 fast)
as of Feb 2015
Grant for home chargers covering 75% of cost up to
£700.
EU regulation requires the UK to develop a rollout
plan for charging infrastructure. The Directive
indicates a target density of 0.1 chargers/vehicle,
depending on the type of EVs and chargers deployed.
Government match funding for private and public
entities that deploy chargers in selected locations
(“Plugged-in Places”)
It is estimated that a network of 2100 rapid charging
sites (10 charging points per site) could provide UK-
wide coverage.
Highways Agency committed to investing £15 M in
order to add 1000 s of new charging points on the
Strategic Road Network. The aim is that motorists
will be no more than 30 km from a charge point
95% of the time
Around 70% of UK households have access to private
parking; however this is as low as 10% in certain
urban areas.
Table 2
Current deployment, policy support measures, future EV mandates and charging infrastructure needs in California.
Source: (California Auto Outlook, 2016; Governor’s Oﬃce, 2015a; AFCD, 2016; NREL, 2014; Governor’s Oﬃce, 2013; California Secretary of State, 2013b.
Current deployment Current government mandates / incentives Future government targets / deployment requirements
EVs 3.2% market share in 2015 (1/2
BEVs, 1/2 PHEVs).
ZEV mandate currently forces the commercialisation of
BEVs and PHEVs in suﬃcient numbers for individual car
manufacturers to generate the necessary number of credits.
Executive order sets a target of 1 m ZEVs on the road
by 2020 and 1.5 m ZEVs by 2025, and for new vehicle
purchases in light-duty ﬂeets of government agencies
to reach 10% ZEVs by 2015 and 25% by 2020.
120,000 EVs on the road in Jan
2015.
Federal tax rebate of up to $7500 (proportional to EV
battery size). California Clean Vehicle Rebate, a state
rebate of $2500 for BEVs and $1500 for PHEVs.
Post−2018, ZEV credits are earned by BEVs and BEV x
with AER>80 km proportional to their AER (e.g.:
160 km AER= 1.5 credits; 480 km AER= 3.5 credits).
PHEVs with AER comprised between 16 and 120 km
also earn credits proportional to the AER 0.4–1.10
credits respectively).
Non-ﬁnancial incentives such as access to high occupancy
vehicle (HOV) lanes and parking beneﬁts.
Large volume car manufacturers have to earn the




3224 public charging stations for a
total of 9577 public charging
points in California as of March
2016.
The California Energy Commission administers a number
of programs providing funding for new charging
infrastructure. It also conducts and commissions studies on
the future need for charging infrastructure across the State.
Executive order mandates the roll-out of the necessary
charging infrastructure to support the ZEV targets.
The California Building Code requires all recently
constructed parking lots or housing to put electrical
capacity in place to easily install EV chargers.
NREL study estimates that, to support the 1 m EVs by
2020 target, between 20k–50k public chargers will be
needed. It suggests two alternative options:
“Home dominant”: 100k workplace and 22,250 public
chargers (of which 550 rapid)
“Public access”: 167k workplace and 48,600 public
chargers (of which 1550 rapid)
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emergence of long-AER BEVs manufactured by Tesla Motors Inc., and
will most likely continue to inﬂuence future OEM decisions about the
AER of their EVs.
As in the UK, EV owners in California are predominantly aﬄuent,
highly educated, multi-vehicle households, and use their EVs as the
main car for frequent, shorter journeys, with similar annual mileages to
ICEVs (Center for Sustainable Energy, 2013). BEV users in California
report that for full satisfaction their vehicles would need to have a
range of more than 250 km (Center for Sustainable Energy, 2013). In
California charging of EVs happens mainly at home, as also in the UK.
PHEV users’ charging behaviour is currently being investigated, but
early results suggest that long-AER PHEVs are used on electricity as
much as possible. EV users generally were not entirely satisﬁed with
public charging infrastructure, although this is improving as infra-
structure coverage increases (Brook Lyndhurst, 2015; Center for
Sustainable Energy, 2013).
5. Analysis and discussion
5.1. Driving patterns and ﬂeet structure: comparing the UK and California
Among the key diﬀerences between UK and California are the
structure of the ﬂeet and the vehicle usage patterns.
We modelled the structure of the 2025–2030 ﬂeet in a simpliﬁed
way. We have assumed that the overall size of the ﬂeet will stay the
same as today. We divided the ﬂeet into four main market segments,
with their size based on new passenger car sales for a reference year and
modelled based on the characteristics of the best-selling cars for that
same year (California Auto Outlook, 2016; SMMT, 2013). A stock
model would provide more accurate projections of future ﬂeet com-
position. However we consider our simpliﬁed approach adequate given
the purpose of the analysis. See Table 3 and Table 4 for the details of
how the future ﬂeets in the UK and California are modelled in our study
(California Auto Outlook, 2016; Cars.com, 2016; DfT, 2008; DoT, 2009;
SMMT, 2013; U.S. News Best Cars, no date; Whatcar.com). In the tables
the vehicle segments are named as is most common. Note that in our
incremental cost model the reference vehicle weight is reduced relative
to today's based on future scenarios on the use of lightweight materials
(Lotus Engineering Inc, 2010), and the powertrain size is downscaled
accordingly (Brooker et al., 2013; Pagerit et al., 2006).
As for the vehicle usage patterns, we analysed data from the UK
National Travel Survey (DfT, 2008) and the US National Household
Travel Survey (DoT, 2009) respectively and we have derived the fre-
quency distributions of daily distances driven shown in Figs. 5 and 6.
These distributions are used when calculating utility factors of PHEVs
and relative shares of home vs public charging for BEVs.
As can be observed from the tables and ﬁgures, the UK and
California markets today are diﬀerent in terms of segments attributes,
relative shares and associated driving patterns. In particular, the
structure of the ﬂeet in California is slanted towards larger and heavier
vehicles. This is generally the case comparing North America with
Europe. Moreover, in the UK larger vehicles are on average driven more
frequently on longer distances and have higher annual mileages than
smaller vehicles, whereas in California all segments are on average
driven similarly and have comparable annual mileages. In our study we
make the simplifying assumption that this will not change until 2030.
Finally, it is worth noting that modelling the ﬂeet as we did has its
limitations. However, as previous studies have shown (Oﬀer et al.,
2011), even a relatively simple segmentation approach like ours can
provide substantial additional insight compared with treating the whole
passenger car market as homogenous.
5.2. UK scenario analysis
Based on the current status and future targets for electriﬁcation
discussed in Section 4.1, we built a set of key scenarios for year 2030
and we have estimated their incremental cost relative to a base case
where the whole passenger car ﬂeet is composed only of ICEVs.
All scenarios are consistent with the UK aspiration of 60% EV
market share, or 8 m EV ﬂeet, by 2030 but diﬀer in terms of the EV
types and related infrastructure deployed. It is also worth noting that,
despite the diﬀerence in EV types across scenarios, average ﬂeet tail-
pipe CO2 emissions are comparable, of the order of 55gCO2/km NEDC.
This is well below the 75-65gCO2/km range currently being discussed
at EU level for the 2030 CO2 ﬂeet average standard for passenger cars.
The key elements of each of the 4 scenarios modelled are listed below
and further illustrated in Table 5.
– Scenarios 1 and 2 are based on the current trend of seeking to bal-
ance the relative shares of BEVs and PHEVs through incentives.
Hence we assume a 40/60 split between BEVs and PHEVs and the
country-wide charging infrastructure needed for rapid adoption of
BEVs.
– In Scenario 1, rapid charging infrastructure is modelled based on the
analysis by (Element Energy, 2015); slow charging infrastructure is
based on the indicative target of the European Commission directive
(European Union, 2014), i.e.: the equivalent of at least 0.1 public
charging points per EV.
– In Scenario 2 only rapid charging infrastructure is present, because
this is seen by users as most valuable, and hence the public charging
point per EV ratio becomes 0.01.
– Taken together, Scenarios 1 and 2 represent possible upper and
lower bounds for a country-wide charging infrastructure in the UK
that is capable of supporting a ﬂeet consisting of a mix of 250 km-
range BEVs and 50 km-AER PHEVs. A 250 km range may be the
least required for BEVs to oﬀer similar functionality to ICEVs.
Finally, we assume that BEVs will penetrate the market across all
Table 3
Structure of the UK market in 2030 – Main segments and their key attributes).
Source: Authors’ scenario, based on (DfT, 2008; SMMT, 2013; Whatcar.com).
Segment Reference model Weight (kg) Power (kW) Annual mileage (km) Fleet share (%)
Mini/Supermini (A/B) Ford Fiesta 1050 64 12,950 40.6
Medium (C/D) Volkswagen Golf 1300 92 14,950 40.8
Executive/Luxury (E/F) Mercedes C-class 1550 135 17,450 4.8
Dual purpose/MPV (H/I) Vauxhall Zaﬁra 1550 105 22,200 11.3
Table 4
Structure of the California market in 2025 – Main segments and their key attributes.
Source: Authors’ scenario, based on (California Auto Outlook, 2016; U.S. News Best Cars











1270 98 19,850 26.8
Medium Honda Accord 1475 140 18,900 31.1
Luxury Mercedes E-
class
1735 224 20,600 10.7
SUV Ford Explorer 2010 216 21,000 20.1
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segments, with the exception of the small car segment (A/B) where
fuel eﬃcient ICEVs currently beneﬁt from a relatively low level of
taxation and where a long-range BEV will be both expensive and not
required. PHEVs are also present in all segments except A/B, due to
the same reasons of cost-competitiveness with ICEVs.
– Scenario 3 meets 60% EV penetration by 2030 with the least amount
of battery capacity and infrastructure installed. This means only
using 100 km-AER PHEVs that do not require public charging in-
frastructure at all and use the same type of batteries as BEVs, sharing
with them all other components of the electric powertrain. Thus
they could generate the necessary scale economies that would also
be needed for BEVs to become competitive. However by not de-
veloping the charging infrastructure and user preferences for BEVs
the latter could become locked out, potentially delaying the
achievement of full electriﬁcation of passenger cars post-2030. A
PHEV-only scenario is also clearly not consistent with current
policy.
– Finally, Scenario 4 oﬀers a compromise where 100 km-AER PHEVs
dominate the market, with the exception of the A/B segment where
only 150 km-range BEVs are present. This is in principle compatible
with the current structure of the Plug-In Vehicle grant that does not
favour longer-AER BEVs and potentially rewards long-AER PHEVs in
the same way as BEVs. In this way the BEV option remains open but,
by targeting the smaller vehicles typically used for shorter distances
in urban areas, expensive long-AER BEVs and a country-wide in-
frastructure is no longer needed. Adoption of BEVs as urban vehicles
can be further encouraged by developing charging infrastructures
accordingly.
Fig. 7 shows the incremental cost of the scenarios as calculated
using our model. The error bar indicates the full range of uncertainty
associated with future battery technology development. In particular,
the highest cost corresponds to today's battery technology cost ($300/
kWh) and energy density (100 Wh/kg) as reported by the leading in-
dustry players, while the lowest cost corresponds to battery technology
meeting its long-term cost reduction target ($100/kWh) and doubling
its energy density. The midpoint case falls exactly in between with
respect to both battery cost and energy density; as far as cost is con-
cerned, $200/kWh is considered as a plausible scenario for 2025–2030
based on recent projections (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015). The same lo-
gics applies to PHEV batteries. The battery cost and energy density
scenarios we built are based on (Element Energy, 2012; IEA, 2016;
Moawad et al., 2016; Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015) and are illustrated in
Tables 6, 7. While it is unlikely that battery technology will not improve
at all by 2025–2030, using today's state of the art as worst case scenario
also gives a sense of the extent to which diﬀerent EV mixes will require
policy support while battery technology develops, and hence of the
cumulative transition cost and technology risk associated with each
particular scenario.
It is worth noting that the absolute value of the incremental cost of
EV scenarios as shown in Fig. 7 is inﬂuenced by the relative cost of
gasoline and electricity as well as other variables, and hence should be
regarded as only indicative. Based on the type of analysis conducted,
the most important insight that can be gleaned is the relative cost of the
diﬀerent EV scenarios. This is particularly sensitive to battery tech-
nology development, less so to other parameters. Accordingly, only the
eﬀect of the former is discussed. However, when examining the results
obtained, it is also important to note that they are based on assumptions
that particularly favour BEVs over PHEVs. Speciﬁcally, we assume EV
batteries to last the whole lifetime of the vehicle; due to the larger size
of the BEV battery pack, having to replace it would incur a much higher
cost penalty than in the case of PHEVs. Moreover, possible grid re-
inforcement costs associated with public charging infrastructure are
excluded, which also favours BEVs over PHEVs. So in eﬀect the risk
associated with large numbers of long-range BEVs could be much
higher.
As can be seen from Fig. 7, Scenarios 1 and 2 show the greatest cost
sensitivity to future battery development, around 40% higher than
Scenario 3 and 4. This means that initially a similar EV mix would have
to be subsidised substantially more than one dominated by long-AER
PHEVs. Even at a BEV battery cost of $200/kWh, Scenarios 1 and 2
would cost around £400–600 M a year more than Scenario 4. Only with
batteries that cost of the order of $100/kWh and have double the en-
ergy density of today's best in class would the cost of all scenarios
Fig. 5. Frequency distribution of daily distances driven in the UK (in km), by vehicle segment.
Source: Authors’ analysis of UK National Travel Survey data (DfT, 2008).
Fig. 6. Frequency distribution of daily distances driven in California (in km), by vehicle segment.
Source: Authors’ analysis of US National Household Travel Survey data (DoT, 2009).
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converge. By comparing Scenarios 1 and 2 we can see that the eﬀect of
reducing infrastructure coverage to only rapid chargers is relatively
minor, of the order of £200 M a year. However our model shows that
even in Scenario 2 the utilisation level of the charging infrastructure
would still be low; with an average of less than two rapid charging
events a day per charger if the AER of BEVs was used in full, the
business case for it would be problematic. Scenario 4 is cheapest and
allows keeping the BEV option open while not being more sensitive to
battery technology development than Scenario 3. Moreover by strate-
gically siting the rapid charging infrastructure in and around urban
areas, better utilisation levels could be achieved at around four charges
a day on average. It therefore follows from our analysis that pursuing an
EV and charging infrastructure mix of the kind of Scenario 4 would
provide a relatively low cost, low risk electriﬁcation path for the UK.
5.3. California scenario analysis
Based on the discussion of current state and future EV targets in
California provided in Section 4.2, we built a set of key scenarios for
year 2025 and estimated their incremental cost, applying the same lo-
gics as for the case of the UK.
All scenarios are consistent with the target of 1.5 m EVs on the roads
in 2025 set by the executive order of the Governor of the State of
California. Although they diﬀer widely in terms of the types of EV and
infrastructure deployed, all scenarios are characterised by comparable
average ﬂeet tailpipe CO2 emissions. The key elements of each of the 5
scenarios modelled are listed below and further illustrated in Table 8;
their respective incremental cost are shown in Fig. 8. It is worth noting
that, with the exception of Scenario 1, all other scenarios mirror those
chosen for the UK, which makes comparing between the two case stu-
dies easier.
– Scenarios 1, 2 and 3, in addition to meeting the Governor's target,
also broadly fulﬁl the requirements of the ZEV mandate in terms of
number of credits and ZEV ﬂoor.
– We assume that the ZEV ﬂoor is met using BEVs only. We do not
model BEVx due to their reduced utility, however we will later
discuss their possible role from a qualitative standpoint, and we do
not consider the eﬀect of possible deployment of FCEVs.
– We assume the BEV/PHEV ratio to be 40/60, although in reality this
will vary somewhat depending on the compliance strategy chosen
by the OEMs. In particular, longer-AER EVs qualify for more credits
hence fewer of them would be required. For simplicity though we
ignore the few percentage point diﬀerence between compliance
scenarios.
– BEVs and PHEVs feature in all segments of the passenger car market,
which is not incompatible with today's rapidly growing oﬀer of new
EV models.
– The only diﬀerence between Scenarios 1 and 2 is the range of the
BEVs, which is 300 km and 250 km respectively. A longer range BEV
earns more credits, so it could provide OEMs with a cheaper way of
complying with the ZEV mandate, while at the same time better
meeting the stated preferences of Californian BEV users. A shorter
range BEV that does not fully satisfy the desire of the users in terms
Table 5
UK 2030 EV and infrastructure scenarios modelled.
Scenario BEV share (%) BEV segments PHEV share (%) PHEV segments BEV AER (km) PHEV AER (km) # slow chargers # fast chargers
1 40 C/D, E/F, (H/I) 60 C/D, E/F, H/I 250 50 300,000 20,000
2 40 C/D, E/F, (H/I) 60 C/D, E/F, H/I 250 50 0 20,000
3 0 – 100 C/D, E/F, H/I – 100 – –
4 20 A/B 80 C/D, E/F, H/I 150 100 – 5000
Fig. 7. Incremental annual user cost of the UK EV and infrastructure scenarios modelled
(in British pounds). The error bars indicate uncertainty associated with future battery
technology development.
Table 6
Range of BEV battery cost and energy density values used in our model. The high case is
in line with today's cost and energy density of BEV batteries and assumes no further
improvement. The low case cost represents the long-term target for automotive OEMs and
battery manufacturers; no speciﬁc target is set for energy density and the value used in
our analysis may be conservative.
Source: (Element Energy, 2012; Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015; Moawad et al., 2016).





Range of PHEV battery cost and energy density values used in our model. High, medium
and low cases have been chosen to be as consistent as possible with those of BEV batteries.
Source: (Element Energy, 2012; IEA, 2016; Moawad et al., 2016.





California 2030 EV and infrastructure scenarios modelled.
Scenario BEV share (%) BEV segments PHEV share (%) PHEV segments BEV range (km) PHEV range (km) # slow chargers # fast chargers
1 40 all 60 all 300 50 75,000 2.250
2 40 all 60 all 250 50 75000 2250
3 40 all 60 all 250 50 30,000 750
4 0 – 100 all – 100 – –
5 20 small 80 medium, luxury, SUV 150 50 35,000 1000
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of range however allows higher utilisation of the battery installed
and hence is more economical. We also assume that the remaining
ZEV credits are earned with 50 km AER PHEVs, which qualify for
circa 0.8 ZEV credits each and enable meeting the overall 1.5 m EV
target.
– In both cases we assume that public infrastructure is provided based
on the 2020 “public access” scenario of the NREL study (NREL,
2014), scaled up to 2025 as appropriate.
– Comparing Scenarios 1 and 2 allows us to test the eﬀect of BEV
range on the incremental cost of electriﬁcation.
– Scenario 3 is the same as Scenario 2, except that the public infra-
structure provision is reduced based on the “home dominant” sce-
nario of the NREL study. Comparing Scenarios 2 and 3 allows as-
sessing the impact of diﬀerent types of public charging
infrastructure in California on incremental costs.
– Scenarios 4 and 5 meet the Governor's target but do not comply with
the ZEV mandate.
– Scenario 4 is based on the same logic as the corresponding one for
the UK, i.e.: to achieve electriﬁcation with the least deployment of
battery capacity and charging infrastructure. This means using
100 km-AER PHEVs and no public charging infrastructure at all.
– Scenario 4 also mirrors the corresponding one for the UK, with
150 km-range BEVs adopted in the small vehicle segment, com-
plemented by 100 km-AER PHEVs in all other segments.
Comparing Fig. 8 (California) with Fig. 7 (UK) we observe a similar
trend across scenarios. In the case of California however we have added
a scenario (Scenario 1) with longer range BEVs that better meet user
requirements while qualifying for more ZEV credits; comparing Sce-
narios 1 and 2 shows that increasing BEV range even by a small amount
has a strong impact on battery technology risk. We also notice that the
economics of long-AER PHEVs in California are overall worse than in
the UK, mainly due to the eﬀect of the extra weight of the series PHEV
powertrain in large, powerful cars. This explains why, as battery
technology improves, the incremental cost of Scenarios 2 and 3 con-
verge with those of Scenarios 4 and 5 more rapidly than the corre-
sponding scenarios for the UK. Comparing Scenarios 2 and 3 on the
other hand shows that the eﬀect of reducing public infrastructure
provision is small, albeit not negligible. The cost of Scenario 3 in par-
ticular could start to converge to those of Scenarios 4 and 5 already at a
battery cost of $200/kWh, assuming that battery lifetime was not an
issue. Whether rapid uptake of BEVs with 250 km range can be
achieved without extensive public charging infrastructure though is not
known. Scenario 4 shows that, if not complying with the ZEV mandate
was an option, the same level of tailpipe emissions could be achieved at
lower risk using only PHEVs with 100 km AER; these have a utility
factor of around 85% if fully charged at home every day and without
using public infrastructure, and require, at least initially, substantially
less support than the other scenarios discussed so far. Finally, Scenario
5 which combines 100 km-AER PHEVs with 150 km-range BEVs may be
preferable as it is only marginally riskier than Scenario 4 while
probably suﬃcient to continue promoting BEV innovation.
5.4. Policy implications
Despite the substantial diﬀerences in terms of passenger car market
structure and usage patterns in the UK and California, we ﬁnd that the
incremental cost of the diﬀerent EV and charging infrastructure mixes
we explored follows qualitatively a similar pattern. In particular, our
analysis suggests that lower cost, lower risk electriﬁcation of passenger
cars in the 2030 timeframe can be achieved through a balanced mix of
relatively short-range BEVs and long-AER PHEVs. This can be broadly
extrapolated to the North American and European markets in general.
While it is apparent that once BEV batteries achieve their cost reduction
target and increase their energy density substantially, long-range BEVs
have the potential to outstrip PHEVs on a cost basis, to rely on this
happening rapidly is potentially risky. Hence the main implication of
our ﬁndings is that, by designing policies primarily aimed at accel-
erating complete electriﬁcation of passenger car transport through
supporting the rapid roll-out of long-AER BEVs and extensive charging
infrastructures, the EV transition may be set on a higher cost, higher
risk path which could eventually result in its losing momentum and
possibly stalling.
When discussing the policy implications of our analysis, however,
the limitations of the methods used should not be overlooked. As al-
ready mentioned in Section 3, the analysis we performed is of the
snapshot type, i.e.: it assesses the incremental cost of electriﬁcation for
year 2030 only. For a full picture of the technology risk associated with
the diﬀerent electriﬁcation pathways, their cumulative cost until year
2030 should be estimated instead. Moreover, our analysis does not
apportion the incremental cost of electriﬁcation among government,
car manufacturers and passenger car buyers. If this was done, further
policy insight could be gained. In fact it is possible that the car man-
ufacturers will prefer, for technical or strategic reasons, to pursue a
technology pathway that we identify as higher risk, and that they will
be prepared to internally subsidise to a large extent. However we do not
want to speculate on this in the absence of suﬃcient evidence. Simi-
larly, we do not want to speculate on the preferences of mainstream EV
buyers in year 2030. Should they be prepared to pay a signiﬁcant
premium for long-range battery electric vehicles over plug-in hybrids
though this would somewhat alter the ﬁndings of our research. This is
however at least in part oﬀset by the favourable assumptions we have
made for BEVs over PHEVs, as discussed in Section 5.2.
We now proceed to further examine the UK and California EV policy
in relation to our ﬁndings. In general, EV policy in both the UK and
California today shows, to diﬀerent degrees, signs of favouring the
rapid development of the BEV market alongside that of PHEVs. The UK
approach is generally cautious and no commitment has so far been
made for the long term, particularly on EV incentives which are re-
viewed periodically. On the infrastructure side, however, the develop-
ment of a country-wide network of chargers may soon be underway.
Hence we argue that, due to the path-dependent nature of EV innova-
tion processes, even a relatively cautious approach based on monitoring
market and technology development and periodically revising support
measures may unintentionally lead to higher-cost, higher-risk path-
ways. The probability of this happening is higher though in the case of
California, where the unique technology-forcing approach of the ZEV
mandate has already had a strong eﬀect on EV innovation and will
continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Based on our analysis, we
also infer that the speciﬁc design of both EV and infrastructure in-
centives and mandates can potentially have a strong impact on the cost
of future EV pathways and is therefore worth considering carefully and
investigating further. Speciﬁc aspects of the UK and California policy
are here brieﬂy discussed in turn.
In the case of the UK, comparing the ﬂeet average CO2 emission
associated with the scenarios we have modelled with the post-2020 EU
ﬂeet average standards for passenger cars currently under discussion,
Fig. 8. Incremental annual user cost of California EV and infrastructure scenarios mod-
elled. The error bars indicate uncertainty associated with future battery technology de-
velopment.
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we notice that there is insuﬃcient regulatory pressure to force the
deployment of EVs on this scale by 2030. Therefore, in the absence of a
UK equivalent to the California ZEV mandate that inﬂuences the di-
rection of EV innovation, the type of EV and infrastructure deployed in
the UK under the current policy framework will largely depend on the
combined eﬀect of the incentives provided, EV models oﬀered and
users’ needs and preferences. In this context, the recently introduced
two-tier incentive system for EVs, with a step in the value at the 110 km
AER mark, arguably favours shorter-AER over longer-AER PHEVs. This
could be rebalanced by either moving the Plug-in Vehicle Grant step to
an AER of 80–100 km so that long-AER PHEVs could also beneﬁt from
the higher grant available to BEVs, or by making the value of the grant
for PHEVs proportional to their AER. As for BEVs, the ﬂat rate of the
grant currently provided is in principle favourable to short-range BEVs
in the city car segment, although these face tough competition from
small, fuel-eﬃcient ICEVs that beneﬁt from low CO2-based taxation. In
all other segments, based on current driving patterns, it is plausible that
BEV users will require their vehicles to have relatively long ranges if
they are to penetrate the market rapidly, for which a higher grant may
be initially required. The other important inﬂuence on BEV adoption in
the UK is the EV charging infrastructure strategy, which is currently
under development. Focusing on providing extensive urban and sub-
urban charging infrastructure, particularly of the rapid type, could
further support the uptake of short-AER BEVs in the small car segment.
On the contrary, a country-wide infrastructure may indirectly en-
courage adoption of long-AER BEVs in larger car segments and prob-
ably also result in low infrastructure utilisation levels.
In California the ZEV mandate shapes EV innovation and forces the
deployment of substantial numbers of these vehicles. In particular, the
current structure of the ZEV credits strongly supports longer-range
BEVs and is likely to have played an important role in the development
of such vehicles, initially by Tesla Motors Inc. and increasingly also by
other OEMs. Post-2018 the ZEV credit structure will change and the
support for longer-range BEVs will weaken but continue to exist. The
eﬀect that this will have on the compliance strategies of the OEMs re-
mains to be seen, though it is plausible that they will introduce more
BEVs with suﬃciently long AER that appeal to customers while earning
the manufacturer more ZEV certiﬁcates per vehicle. On the other hand,
short-range BEVs are not a natural ﬁt in California, not even in the
small vehicle segment as these vehicle tend to be driven for similar
distances to larger vehicles. As for PHEVs, the current structure of ZEV
credits and EV incentives favours longer-AER PHEVs. However, the ZEV
ﬂoor present in the mandate limits the contribution these will likely
make to the EV ﬂeet. Despite the increased ﬂexibility granted by the
recently introduced category of BEVx, which is allowed to generate up
to half of the credits needed to meet the ZEV ﬂoor, the tension between
supporting strong BEV innovation and achieving the necessary level of
CO2 emission reduction at a low cost remains. In conclusion, the evo-
lution of the California ZEV mandate suggests that costs are increas-
ingly being taken into consideration. However, given the strong inﬂu-
ence that this has on EV innovation in the US and beyond, we argue that
more could be done to guide the EV transition towards a path that is
robust under uncertainty. An option could be to calculate credits based
on actual electric miles driven as opposed to range. Our analysis sug-
gests that a balanced mix of EVs in California in 2025–2030 should
include long-AER PHEVs and possibly also relatively short-range BEVs
in speciﬁc segments where they can be competitive such as shared
urban car ﬂeets. BEVx, if adequately supported, could facilitate the
subsequent transition from long-AER PHEVs to BEVs.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in our analysis we have not
taken into account new technology paradigms such as autonomous
vehicles, shared ownership, and mobility services. In the long term
these could have a profound eﬀect on the passenger car market struc-
ture and use patterns. However our modelling approach lends itself to
this type of analysis and we recommend that these eﬀects are accounted
for especially if extending the timeframe of the analysis beyond 2030.
6. Conclusions
In this study we have considered whether current EV and infra-
structure policy is conducive to cost-eﬀective electriﬁcation of pas-
senger car transport. To investigate this, we developed a model that
estimates the incremental cost of diﬀerent EV and infrastructure mixes
over the whole passenger car ﬂeet, compared with a base case where
only ICEVs are present. We have applied our model to the two case
studies, the UK and California, because both are aggressively pursuing
electriﬁcation and are illustrative of Europe and North America. We
base our analysis around year 2025–2030. For both we have developed
a set of key scenarios that are broadly consistent with current policy
approaches. All scenarios are characterised by the same overall number
of EVs and similar ﬂeet average CO2 tailpipe emissions, however they
diﬀer in the type of EVs and infrastructure deployed.
Despite the substantial diﬀerences in the passenger car market
structure and use between the UK and California, the results we have
obtained are qualitatively similar. Notwithstanding the limitations of
the methods used, our results suggest that policy strongly backing BEV
innovation by promoting rapid uptake of a near equal split between
BEVs and PHEVs exposes the passenger car transport system to a higher
risk in relation to future battery technology development. This is be-
cause rapidly achieving high levels of BEV penetration will involve
making their functionality close to that of ICEVs, which means equip-
ping them with large batteries providing extensive charging infra-
structure networks so they can travel anywhere with minimum incon-
venience. While the incremental cost of extensive charging
infrastructure may be relatively small compared to that of large bat-
teries, its level of utilisation will probably be low, making its economics
problematic.
We also ﬁnd that an approach where BEVs are limited to the rela-
tively short-range, small vehicle segment, supported by mainly urban
charging infrastructure networks, and where relatively long-all electric
range (AER) PHEVs are prevalent in all other segments is one that could
substantially reduce the risk of the cost of the EV transition becoming
unsustainable by 2030 or earlier. Long-AER PHEVs have most power-
train components in common with BEVs, so technology development
and scale economies could still be realised that would pave the way for
possible future substitution by long-range BEVs should battery tech-
nology improve suﬃciently. At the same time, by continuing to support
BEVs where they are less costly, this option would not become locked
out and would allow more time for user practices and institutions to
adapt, thus better preparing for rapid BEV uptake later on.
It is clear from UK and California policy that neither government is
prepared to sustain EV incentives indeﬁnitely and both will seek ways
of achieving their policy goals at the least cost. As the case studies of the
UK and California show, by assessing the future incremental cost of EV
mixes that follow from current policy we have identiﬁed possible cri-
ticalities that, if further researched and adequately addressed, could
contribute to making EV policy more robust under uncertainty.
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.07.062.
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